Decision making and memory: a critique of Juslin and Olsson's (1997) sampling model of sensory discrimination.
P. Juslin and H. Olsson's (1997) distinction between Thurstonian and Brunswikian uncertainty is examined and their sampling model of sensory discrimination analyzed as a representative of the class of memoryless decision processes. The separate characteristics and combined behavior of 4 main components of the model are explored: (a) the basic decision process, (b) the assumption of deadline responding, (c) the moving window model of memory, and (d) the hypothesized basis for confidence. It is argued that grafting a moving window memory onto a memoryless decision process has several undesirable consequences. Moreover, the suggested basis for confidence leads to predictions that are counterintuitive and unsupported by empirical evidence. It is concluded that the window-sampling model is a maladapted combination of inappropriate elements, which is implausible as a model of decision making, memory, or confidence, in sensory discrimination.